Abstract. According to a traditional line of interpretation, Plato's introduction of the three-part soul in Republic 4 was motivated in part by his desire to acknowledge and account for cases of akratic action, and thereby to repudiate the psychology and the conclusions of the earlier dialogue Protagoras. In this paper I reject this interpretation, arguing that countenancing akrasia was never a major philosophical concern for Plato, and a fortiori that it was not his motivation for introducing the tripartite soul. I argue that his moral psychological focus and concern in the Republic was rather on the notion of psychic rule, and on illuminating various ways in which reasoning is corrupted by non-rational desires (rather than overcome by them through brute psychic 'force'). I then offer an explanation of Plato's evident lack of concern for akrasia by appealing to the Protagoras itself. I conclude with a rejection of sharp developmentalism between the two dialogues.
'akrasia' to cases in which an agent performs some action while believing, and despite believing, that she should do otherwise-that is, to cases in which an agent's appetites 'force' her to act against her concurrently held better judgment (rather than, say, by causing her to vacillate in that judgment).
I will begin by arguing, in §1 and §2, that tripartite theory is not concerned with explaining akratic action, but rather with providing the resources to elucidate the notion of psychic control or rule. As I will show in §3, however, psychic control or rule-even when it is exercised by the inferior appetitive element in the soul-is not understood on the model of akrasia. As the Republic presents it, appetite does not exercise control over an agent's soul by forcing the agent to act against her better judgment, but rather by, in various ways, corrupting the agent's reasoning and judgment. One of the primary aims of my paper, then-in addition to challenging the view that acknowledging akrasia is a motivation for tripartite psychology-is to contribute a careful analysis of Plato's presentation and understanding of self-mastery and psychic rule in the Republic. In §4 I will offer an account of why Plato was primarily concerned with psychic rule. Drawing on the Protagoras and Phaedo, I will suggest that the answer has much to do with what Plato finds 'ridiculous' or 'strange' about the many's understanding of akrasia. Finally, in §5, I will address the issue of developmentalism. If my account is correct, then there may be much more continuity between the moral psychology of Protagoras and Republic than is typically thought.
Akrasia in the Republic
There are at least three initial reasons for doubting the view that Plato introduces tripartite psychology in order to recognize and explain the phenomenon of akrasia. First, as some commentators have previously noted, tripartition of the soul is not necessary for not; (b) she is insistent that the Republic is committed to denying the possibility of akrasia, whereas my own conclusions are somewhat weaker; and (c) her account turns on the question whether appetites and emotions are 'good-dependent' or 'good-independent' in the Republic, whereas nothing in my account depends on that issue. (See n. 44 for more on the good-dependent or -independent status of appetites.) distinction between the reasoning and spirited parts of the soul, he appeals to the case of Odysseus, who "struck his breast and spoke to his heart" in order to quell his spirited anger. "Here", Socrates explains, "Homer clearly represents the part that has calculated about better and worse as different from the part that is angry without calculation" (441b6-c2). Although Socrates himself does not explicitly indicate whether reason or anger ultimately prevails in this conflict, reason's victory is nonetheless clear: in the quoted passage from Homer, Odysseus does not rashly retaliate against the insolent suitors and maidservants, but instead patiently waits to carry out his plan for a more glorious revenge. Odysseus, like the thirsty individuals, does not act akratically.
The case of Leontius, to which Socrates appeals to illustrate the conflict between appetite and spirit, is more complicated. According to the story Socrates has heard, Leontius was once walking up from the Piraeus when he saw some corpses lying by the public executioner:
He had an appetite to look at them but at the same time he was disgusted and turned away. For a time he struggled with himself and covered his face, but, finally, overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, 'Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the admirable sight!' […] [That story] certain proves that anger sometimes makes war against the appetites as one thing against another (439e9-440a6).
Leontius is often taken to be the Republic's paradigmatic exemplar of akratic behavior, 10 and there is some prima facie justification for this reading. Unlike the two previous cases, in Leontius we have a clear instance of an agent acting in accordance with a recalcitrant non-rational impulse: he is 'overpowered' (κρατούμενος) by his appetite.
However, this does not yet make it a case of akrasia, because what we do not have is any explicit indication that, when Leontius acts on his appetitive desire, he is at the same time acting against his rational judgment. The only psychic factors Socrates explicitly cites are appetite on the one hand and anger on the other. 11 Of course, Socrates also does not deny that Leontius acts against a rational judgment when he gazes at the corpses, and many commentators have found it natural to suppose that Leontius does act against such a judgment. 12 This reading seems to receive support from the comments that follow.
Socrates continues, "Besides, don't we often notice in other cases that when appetite forces someone contrary to rational calculation, he reproaches himself and gets angry with that in him that's doing the forcing, so that of the two factions that are fighting in a civil war, so to speak, spirit allies itself with reason?" (440a8-b4). 13 On the surface, this remark seems to acknowledge that appetites sometimes 'force' agents to act akratically against their better judgment. If that is correct, and if we are supposed to read this comment back into the preceding case of Leontius, then Leontius' corpse-gazing does turn out to be an instance of akrasia.
I will return to this important passage later in the paper. For now, it is enough to note that even if the remarks at 440a-b do imply that Leontius acts akratically, Socrates himself avoids bringing that implication to the surface when he describes the case. That, in itself, is sufficient to undermine the prevalent view. If, as the developmentalist picture claims, tripartition is introduced in order to countenance and explain akratic behavior, then we would expect Plato to make a clear, unambiguous case of akrasia the focal point of his discussion. Instead, he systematically avoids doing so: in the two cases in Book 4 in which he makes it explicit that reasoning is involved in a psychic conflict, reasoning prevails; and in the one case in which a non-rational impulse prevails, Plato does not make it explicit that reasoning is involved at all. In other words, precisely when Plato has the opportunity to recognize the possibility of akratic action and repudiate the conclusions of the Protagoras (and precisely when, on the prevalent view, that is one of his primary objectives), he does not. when what is better in the city rules over the worse, the city is 'stronger than itself'; when the opposite is the case, the city is 'weaker than itself'. In order to complete the aim of his discussion, Socrates goes on to identify moderation in the city as the condition in which, not only does the better part of the city rule, but everyone in the city also shares the opinion that it ought to rule.
17
15 Dorter (2006: 109) also draws attention to the connection between Rep. 430e ff. and the many's position in the Protagoras. 16 Having not yet introduced the tripartite soul, Socrates does not speak explicitly of parts, but uses the substantivized τὸ βέλτιον and τὸ χεῖρον. 17 Further discussion of 430d ff. can be found in Annas 1981: 115-8; Dorion 2012: 34-8; Dorter 2006: 107-10; and Dyson 1976: 36. It is important to note a shift in language that occurs in the above passage. When
Socrates speaks of the individual case of being 'stronger' or 'weaker' than oneself, he speaks of one element in the soul 'controlling' or 'mastering' (ἐγκρατές, κρατῃθῇ) the other. When he applies his analysis to the political case, however, he speaks of one element in the city 'ruling' (ἄρχει) the other. The two cases are clearly meant to be analogous: Socrates tells Glaucon that he will find "one of these conditions" in their city. (and where such rule is sometimes characterized as 'controlling' or 'mastering'). After introducing the three parts of the soul, for example, Socrates says that the reasoning part of the soul is supposed to rule (441e4), but that the appetitive part "attempts to enslave
[καταδουλώσασθαι] and rule over the classes it isn't fitted to rule" (442b1-2).
Moderation in the soul, moreover, like moderation in the city, involves an agreement among the soul's parts that the best part ought to rule (442c-d). Socrates concludes, "Then isn't to produce justice to establish the parts of the soul in a natural relation of mastering, and being mastered by [κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι], one another, while to produce injustice is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled [ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι] contrary to nature?" (444d8-11). 18 Socrates goes on, in Books 8 and 9, to 18 Whiting (2012: 200-2) argues, on the basis of 444d8-11 and the medical analogy on which Socrates draws in that passage, that Plato employs the terms 'master' (κρατεῖν) and 'rule' (ἄρχειν) differently in the Republic. She suggests that for Plato, 'mastery' consists in the 'healthy' blending of the soul's elements, such that no distinct part or parts are required to maintain control over other distinct parts. 'Ruling', on the other hand, involves an 'unhealthy' separation of the soul's elements, such that some parts do need to control others. Plato's ideal, she suggests, is modeled on the former, rather than the latter: in the ideal soul, there will not be distinct, competing elements, and hence no need for any of those elements to control the others. She writes, "The true ideal is ultimately anarchic, and […] the need for ruling and being ruled is already problematic." Whiting's distinction between κρατεῖν and ἄρχειν, however, simply does not hold up to an examination of Plato's use of those two terms throughout the text. We have already seen, how, at 430e6-431d5, Socrates assimilates the concept of mastery to the concept of rule. Moreover, in that same passage, he describes the unhealthy state of the individual's soul in terms of mastery and the healthy state of the city in terms of rule. Likewise, he uses the two terms (and a wide variety of others, for that matter) indiscriminately and interchangeably throughout the discuss the various kinds of psychic 'regimes' that can arise, and the language of rule continues to dominate that discussion: parts of the soul and their desires 'rule' one another (ἀρχήν, 550b6; cf. 571c4, 590c4);; they 'enslave' one another (καταδουλωσάμενος, 553d2; cf. 577d4);; they 'master' (κρατούσας, 554e1; cf. 574d9) or 'control' (ἐγκρατέστατος, 589b1) one another; and they act as kings (βασιλέα, 555c6), tyrants (τυραννευθείς, 574e2), and despots (δεσπόζειν, 577d5) . of them at 430e-431d. Having recast the popular language of akrasia in terms of psychic rule, it is the latter that becomes the focus of the text. This revision of the popular notion is highlighted in Book 9: Socrates concludes that the best, most just, and happiest text: at 550b, the spirited part 'rules' the soul;; at 554e1, the oligarchic man's better desires 'master' his worse;; at 571c4, the reasoning part of the soul is approvingly referred as the 'ruling' part;; at 574d9, just beliefs are 'mastered' by unjust ones;; at 590c4, the reasoning part of the soul is too weak to 'rule' the other parts;; and at 606d5 poetry establishes our non-rational impulses as 'rulers' in us when instead "they ought to be ruled". Finally, the decisive blow to Whiting's proposal of an anarchic ideal comes at 580b8-c4, where Socrates concludes, "Shall we, then, hire a herald, or shall I myself announce that the son of Ariston has given as his verdict that the best, the most just, and the most happy is the most kingly, who is king of himself [βασιλεύοντα αὑτοῦ]." 19 Kahn (1996: 254-5 ) recognizes this point, stating that in the Republic, " [Plato's] concern is not with moral weakness but with alternative principles that can rule in the psyche. " Ferrari (2007: 169) concurs that akrasia is not Plato's focus: "All should agree that it is the wider concept of mental conflict rather than the narrower concept of weakness of will that Book 4 in fact discusses." Cf. also Shields 2007: 82. individual is the one who is 'king of himself', while the worst, most unjust, and most miserable individual is the one who is 'tyrant of himself' (580b-c). The language of being 'king' or 'tyrant' of oneself is clearly intended to parallel the paradoxical language of being 'stronger' and 'weaker' than oneself. The notion of akrasia, however, has been left behind in favor of psychic rule.
The Rule of Appetite
Although Plato makes psychic rule the central notion in the Republic's treatment of the tripartite soul, that does not yet preclude the possibility that akrasia has an important role to play in the text as well. In particular, if it turns out that appetite's rule or control in the soul prominently involves, or is precipitated by, instances of akratic behavior, then akrasia would prove to be more important to Plato's moral psychology than I have so far suggested. 20 Given that appetite's control of the soul necessarily involves some sort of subversion or domination of the reasoning part, it is worth asking whether that subversion or domination amounts to, or involves, akrasia. In what follows I will examine the picture of appetitive psychic rule that emerges over the course of the Republic, and I will argue that akratic action does not play any significant role in that picture: the manner in which appetite comes to take control of the soul does not involve or amount to akrasia, nor does its rule consist in the akratic domination of reason.
There are two seemingly distinct-but ultimately reconcilable, I will showmodels of appetitive psychic rule that are suggested by the text. According to the first, which I will refer to as the Ignorance Model, appetite's subversion of reason involves the corruption of rational judgments. On this model, the individual who is ruled by her appetitive part is ignorant: she holds mistaken beliefs about what is valuable or good, and those mistaken beliefs are informed by the interests of the appetitive part of her soul.
There are at least three important discussions in the Republic that support this model. The first is Socrates' analysis of 'vicious' psychic regimes in Books 8 and 9. Throughout that 20 Lesses (1987: 148) , for example, understands appetite's unjust rule of reason to involve akratic behavior. I focus on appetite in what follows because it is the part of the soul responsible for the kinds of desires most commonly associated with akratic behavior-namely, desires for pleasure. See §5 for further discussion.
discussion Socrates' description of the manner in which a new psychic element comes to assume control of a person's soul overwhelmingly emphasizes changes in the person's beliefs. Perhaps the clearest example, and certainly the one most relevant to the present discussion, is his characterization of the oligarchic individual's origins:
Don't you think that this person would establish his appetitive and money-making part on the throne, setting it up as the great king within himself [ἐγκαθίζειν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ], adorning it with golden tiaras and collars and girding it with Persian swords?... He makes the reasoning and spirited parts sit on the ground beneath appetite, one on either side, reducing them to slaves [καταδουλωσάμενος] . He won't allow the first to reason about or investigate anything except how a little money can be made into great wealth. And he won't allow the second to value or admire anything but wealth and wealthy people or to have any ambition other than the acquisition of wealth or whatever might contribute to getting it (553c4-d7).
In this dramatic depiction, appetite becomes the ruler of the oligarchic individual's soul, while reason becomes the slave of appetite. However, it is clear that the appetitive part's domination of reason does not consist in forcing the individual to act contrary to his rational judgments. Rather, its domination of reason consists in changing what reason's judgments are. 21 The oligarchic individual uses his reasoning for nothing other than figuring out how to maximize his wealth. Far from being opposed to his appetitive interests and desires, his reasoning actually supports those interests and assists him in promoting them. The oligarchic man, then, does not pursue money akratically; he pursues it having come to believe that wealth is the greatest good.
Similarly, Socrates says that an individual becomes 'democratic' when the 'unnecessary' appetites in him perceive that he lacks learning (μαθημάτων) and true speeches (λόγων ἀληθῶν) in the 'Acropolis' of his soul. "And in the absence of these guardians", Socrates explains, "false and pretentious speeches and beliefs [ψευδεῖς δὴ 21 Carone (2001:135) also draws on this passage to support the view that non-rational domination of reason in general involves influencing rational judgment: "When a lower part predominates, it does so by making the whole soul subject to its desires and beliefs." My understanding of appetite's 'rule' in the oligarchic soul is consistent with the accounts of Brown 2012: 68-9; Cooper 1999b: 127, n. 13; ; Johnstone 2011; ; and Lorenz 2006: 157. Brown understands Plato's conception of psychic rule to be informed by what he calls the 'principle of psychological hegemony', according to which, "To be ruled by a soul-part is to take the ends of that soul-part to be one's ends, generally." Johnstone provides an especially in-depth and insightful analysis of the regime changes in Books 8 and 9.
καὶ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι] rush up and occupy this part of him" (560b7-c3).
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As in the case of the oligarchic individual, the regime change that takes place in the democratic man's soul is characterized in part by a change in his beliefs. The words that
Plato uses to describe those beliefs and the speeches that accompany them are significant, moreover. First, they are false beliefs-that is, they amount to instances of ignorance.
Second, they are 'pretentious' or 'boastful' speeches and beliefs: although they are false, they misleadingly present themselves as true. They are, in other words, persuasive.
Significantly, Plato often associates 'pretentious' speech of this kind with the appetitive part of the soul and with its characteristic object, pleasure. In the Philebus, for example, Socrates declares that pleasure is "the greatest pretender of all" (ἁπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, 65c5), and in the Phaedrus, he characterizes the 'bad' horse, which represents the appetitive part of the tripartite soul, as a "companion of pretension"
(ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος, 253e3). The plausible idea contained in these characterizations is that, when we are under the influence of our desires for pleasure, we often entertain, and sometimes ultimately accept, spurious chains of reasoning that support and justify the indulgence of those desires. In other words, we rationalize our appetites. This is, in fact, precisely the effect that the bad horse tries to bring about in the Phaedrus. When the individual resists his appetitive desire for sexual contact with a beautiful boy, the bad horse tries to convince the good horse and the charioteer (representing the spirited and reasoning parts of the soul, respectively) to follow its lead by tempting them with 'pretentious' rhetoric. What all of this suggests is that when the appetitive part of the soul and its desires exert control over, or assume rule of, the soul, that control or rule 22 And cf. Socrates' mention of beliefs in his discussion of the tyrannical individual: "And in all this, the old traditional opinions that he held from childhood about what is fine or shamefulopinions that are accounted just-are mastered (κρατήσουσι) by the opinions, newly released from slavery, that are now the bodyguard of erotic love" (574d5-9). Socrates concludes that the soul of the tyrant "least of all does what it wants" (ἥκιστα ποιεῖ ἅ βούλεται), and that, "forcibly dragged by the stings of a dronish gadfly, it will be full of disorder and regret" (ὑπὸ δὲ οἴστρου ἀεὶ ἑλκομένη βίᾳ ταραχῆς καὶ μεταμελείας μεστὴ ἔσται, 577d10-e3). Notice that his conclusions distinctly echo the 'Socratic' claims of two earlier dialogues. First, in the Gorgias Socrates argues that although tyrants do "whatever they think best" (αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον ei\ ναι), they do not do what they really want (βούλονται) (466d9-e1 and ff. Once again, the picture of appetitive control of the soul that emerges from this passage is one in which appetite assumes psychic power or influences the individual's behavior by bringing about a change in the individual's beliefs. Nothing in this passage suggests that appetites assume control in the soul or influence an individual's behavior simply by forcing the individual to act against his better judgment. Rather, his nonrational affections and desires, including those related to pleasure, bring about his action (if they do at all) by making him (at least temporarily) ignorant: they cause him to abandon a true belief. 23 A further point suggests that non-rational impulses affect behavior exclusively by causing the individual to change his mind. In his immediately subsequent remarks, Socrates outlines the tests and trials to which the young must submit in order to determine which of them are more fit to become rulers. Crucially, the only trials he requires of them are those that test their retention of lawful beliefs in the face of pleasures and pains. If akrasia were possible, or at least, if it were a phenomenon that 23 O'Brien (1967: 138, n. 21 ;; cf. 155) observes, "At Rep. 412e the danger to the young Guardiansin-training is not that they will act against their right opinion but that they will lose it through persuasion, pain, pleasure, or fear."
Plato considered ubiquitous or significant, then we would not expect such tests to represent a complete, effective examination of the guardians' moral fortitude. For if akrasia were a threat, then maintaining one's lawful belief about how one ought to act would not be sufficient for actually behaving that way. The fact that Socrates' presents the retention of correct beliefs as the sole criterion of success in these tests, then, suggests that whenever people act viciously on account of their non-rational impulses, they do so because they have changed their minds.
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Finally, in Book 7, Socrates likens appetitive pleasures to 'leaden weights' that 'bind' the soul to the realm of becoming. They drag reason's vision downward, he says, thereby preventing it from turning 'upward' toward the realm of true reality (519a-b).
This image echoes Socrates' claim in the Phaedo that pleasures and pains are nails that 'rivet' the soul to the body and make it share the body's beliefs and desires (83c-d). What these images suggest is that appetites and their associated pleasures subvert the authority of reason by misdirecting its focus. Under the influence of pleasure, the rational part of the soul pays attention to, reasons about, and comes to desire the ends of appetite.
Socrates confirms this interpretation in his introduction to the 'leaden weights' image: he says that the reasoning of those who are reputedly "vicious but clever" is "forced to serve evil ends, so that the sharper it sees, the more evil it accomplishes" (519a1-6). The picture of appetitive domination of reason that we find here, then, is precisely that which We surely know that, when someone's desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened for others, just like a stream that has been partly diverted into another 24 I explore this passage and its implications in much more detail in Wilburn (forthcoming). Cf. also discussion in The passage indicates that our desires (particularly our appetitive and rational ones) bear something like a zero-sum relation to one another: as one set of desires gets stronger, our other desires become correspondingly weaker. 25 Socrates' focus here is on the relationship between reason and appetite. When our rational desires become strong, he says, our appetites for bodily pleasure and money are thereby weakened. The clear implication is that the converse is also true: when our appetitive desires are strong, our rational ones will thereby be weakened as well. This picture is confirmed throughout the text by comments that point to a competitive tension between rational and appetitive interests. While describing the city's shift toward an oligarchic regime in Book 8, for example, Socrates says, "From there they proceed further into money-making, and the more honorable they consider it, the less honorable they consider virtue. Or aren't virtue and wealth opposed, as if they were set on the scales of a balance, always inclining in opposite directions?" (550e4-8). 26 What these passages indicate is that our appetitive desires do not motivate us completely 'independently' of our rational ones. That is, it is not the case that our appetites can become strong enough to overcome our rational desires without thereby affecting the strength of those rational desires. Rather, appetite's becoming strong enough to determine our behavior necessarily involves a corresponding decrease in the strength of our rational motivations. 27 According to this Hydraulic Model, appetite's domination of reason involves a weakening of reason and its desires.
On the surface, at least, the Hydraulic Model seems distinct from the Ignorance Model. The latter takes appetitive rule to involve the corruption of the reasoning part, 25 Brown (2012: 68) also draws attention to this passage and its endorsement of what he calls the 'hydraulic principle of psychology'. The channeling passage is also discussed in Gill 1985: 19-21; Grube 1980: 135; and Kahn 1987: 95-101. 26 Cf. 328d and 605b3-5.
27 Carone (2004: 71; cf. 2001: 128-29) notes the trouble 485d poses for advocates of the view that "desire can have a strength independent of the strength of reason, if that is taken to imply that desire can get stronger without reason getting weaker, and vice versa."
while the former takes it to involve the weakening of it. As a matter of fact, however, there is no reason why we should not understand these to amount to the same thing. The two models can be reconciled as long as we understand reason's 'weakness' to consist in its susceptibility to make false judgments and desire the wrong things under the influence of non-rational appetite and emotion. In other words, the stronger appetite and its desires become, the weaker reason becomes; and the weaker reason becomes, the weaker and If the picture I have outlined is correct, then acknowledging and explaining akrasia was never a significant concern for Plato and hence was not the motivation for tripartite theory. Instead, Plato's concern in the Republic was with the broader notion of psychic control or rule, which he understood on the model of ignorance and weak or corrupt judgment. The question at this point is the following: why was accounting for akrasia never a primary concern for Plato?
In order to answer that question, we should begin by distinguishing two ways in which the reasoning part of the soul might fail to maintain proper control or rule in the soul. The first type of failure is (1) local failure. Local failures are temporary failures of reason: an individual fails to carry out her rational judgment in a specific instance under the influence of non-rational appetite or emotion. Local failures can in turn be divided into two kinds. First, (1a) temporary changes of judgment: an individual initially judges that a given action is wrong, but she temporarily changes her mind under the influence of appetite and ends up performing the action anyway. Afterward, her initial judgment of the action's value returns, and the agent regrets, or may regret, having performed it.
Second, (1b) instances of akrasia: the individual judges that a given action is wrong, but her appetite is more psychologically forceful than her judgment, and she performs the action while continuing to believe that she should not. 30 The second main type of failure is (2) global failure. Global failures represent long-term, systematic corruptions of an individual's reasoning about what is valuable. Under the influence of non-rational desire in fact a good […] The stronger the appetite, the more 'convincing' this power will be." However, they take this picture to be "entirely distinct from what we find in the later books of the Republic" (2010: 107) . Ferrari (2007: 199) evidently shares my interpretation of psychic rule in the Republic: he claims that any soul that falls short of the ideal rule of reason falls short not only because the other parts are strong, but also because reason is correspondingly weak. He then adds (n. 27): "This schema leaves room for the possibility that the weakness of will to which such imperfect characters might be subject could continue to be traced to an intellectual mistake, to wrong thinking, as we found Socrates claiming in dialogues other than the With these distinctions in place, we can identify at least two reasons why Plato was concerned with psychic control or rule rather than akrasia. The first has to do with the ethical priority of global failures. Simply put, for the purposes of promoting virtue and minimizing vice, the prevention and correction of global failures is much more important than the prevention of local ones. We can see adumbrations of this point by examining Plato's treatment of the many's position in the Protagoras. According to the many, people frequently fail to do something they know is good and willingly do something they know is worse instead because they are 'overcome by pleasure'. In other words, the many claim that people can and often do act akratically. Significantly, in
Socrates' reply to their account, he places repeated stress on the many's commitment to hedonism. In the exchange leading up to his refutation of their position, Socrates provides at least three explicit opportunities for the many to acknowledge some other criterion of goodness aside from pleasure, and all three times he and Protagoras attest to their failure to do so. 31 Finally, in the passage that immediately precedes Socrates' argument against their view, he says:
31 See 354b7-c3, 354d1-4, and 354d7-e2. Cf. discussion in Vlastos 1969: 77, n. 24. Against this view, however, Ferrari 1990: 132-4 and n. 29; Hackforth 1928: 41; Irwin 1977: 309, n. 13; and Nussbaum 1986: 111 , argue that hedonism is not really the many's position. Rather, they claim, Socrates has to argue them into it. As evidence, they cite the fact that in response to Protagoras' initial resistance to Socrates' suggestion that all pleasures are good, Socrates asks, "Surely you don't, like the many, call some pleasant things bad and some painful things good?" (351c2-3).
However, if we turn to the Republic, we can see that this passage does not necessarily tell against the many's hedonism. In his discussion with Adeimantus about the nature of the Good in Book 6, Socrates remarks, "You certainly know that the many believe the good is pleasure, while the more sophisticated believe that it is knowledge." Then, after explaining how those who define the good as knowledge run into difficulties, he asks, "What about those who define the good as pleasure? Are they any less full of confusion than the others? Aren't even they forced to admit that there are bad pleasures? [...] So, I think, they have to agree that the same things are both good and bad. Isn't that true?" (505b5-c11). What these comments suggest is that Plato took the many to be committed both to hedonism and (despite its being in tension with hedonism) to the view Even now it is still possible to withdraw, if you are able to say that the good is anything other than pleasure or that the bad is anything other than pain. Or is it enough for you to live pleasantly without pain? If it is enough, and you are not able to say anything else than that the good and the bad are that which result in pleasure and pain, listen to this. For I say to you that if this is so, your position will become ridiculous [γελοῖον] (354e8-355a6).
These remarks are noteworthy for two reasons. 32 that some pleasures are good and others bad. At any rate, it is clear that he did not find it implausible for these two commitments to sit (uncomfortably, in Plato's mind) alongside one another, particularly in those who are 'full of confusion' like the many. If this is correct, then Socrates' comment at 351c does nothing to undermine the hedonism of the many. 32 My understanding of the 'ridiculous' of the many's position is in line with Dyson's interpretation (1976: 36) . He comments: "What is absurd? Merely that, on a very simple level, the popular thesis is silly. One cannot explain why a man who can do something good does something which he knows is bad, by saying that he is overcome by good […] There is another linguistic aspect too: the verb 'overcome', ἡττώμενος, appropriate to reprehensible conditions in moral contexts, is ludicrous when combined with 'by good', ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ." Vlastos (1956: xxxix) adopts a similar view, while Gallop (1964: 118-9) responds to Vlastos's account and proposes a much more complicated understanding of the 'absurdity' of the many's position. Gallop's interpretation is largely motivated by the assumption that when Socrates draws attention to the 'absurdity' of their position, he is drawing attention to a self-contradiction. Similarly, in response to Gallop's criticism, Vlastos (1969: 78-83 ) later repudiates his earlier view because he finds that it cannot account for the sense in which the many's position contradicts itself. Like Dyson, however, I do not take Socrates to be pointing out a self-contradiction. (Or at least, I do not take the 'ridiculousness' that would be immediately clear and compelling to the many to There is, however, a further, related ridiculousness, which Socrates' interlocutors no doubt fail to notice, but which comes to the surface when we substitute the word 'worse' in the many's original formulation with 'less pleasurable' (again, a move justified by the hedonistic premise). The many's position then becomes: people pursue what is less pleasurable, knowing it to be less pleasurable, because they are 'weaker than pleasure'. The ridiculousness of this formulation parallels that of the previous one: being weaker than pleasure should mean that one is pursuing what is more pleasurable, not what is less pleasurable. The effect of this reformulation is that it turns the many's account on its head and exposes them for what they are-namely, individuals ruled by pleasure. The many believe that their being weaker than pleasure is limited to instances of momentary weakness in the face of temptation, and that such instances constitute the main obstacle to their happiness. That is why, when Socrates suggests that an 'art of measurement' would provide them with the ability to unfailingly select the maximum amount of pleasure, they greedily embrace it as their 'salvation' in life. In fact, however, such an art of measurement would not provide the happiness the many desire. Because of their hedonism, the many turn out to be weaker than pleasure whether they resist immediate pleasure or not. 33 Indeed, the preceding suggests that their being weaker than pleasure is demonstrated even more distinctly by those instances in which they successfully resist temptations for the sake of greater long-term pleasure-in other words, by precisely those instances in which they take themselves to have advanced their happiness by being 'stronger' than pleasure. Because they wrongly identify pleasure and consist in that kind of logical inconsistency.) This is not, in other words, a formal reductio. Nor should we suspect that it is supposed to be: γελοῖον does not mean 'self-contradictory', but rather 'ridiculous' or 'deserving of laughter'. What Socrates has shown, then, is simply that there is something 'funny' about the many's position-and that is why his imagined interlocutor immediately responds by laughing (γελάσεται, 355c8). Ferrari (1990: 119, n. 6 ) also endorses Dyson's interpretation. 33 Ferrari's (1990) admirable treatment of the Protagoras presses a similar line of interpretation. He argues that the many of the Protagoras are 'ignorant of their ignorance', because they wrongly take themselves to 'know' what it is that they need to live a good life-namely, a measuring art of the kind outlined by Socrates. However, Ferrari notes (124), "Even if those people were fully adept at the art of measurement he describes, and so could 'find security in life' (356e2, e6), they would not, after all, truly be able to 'save their lives' […] For the life guided by such measurement is enslaved to the body." Cf. Segvic 2000: 31: "The akratic agent not only lacks knowledge of what is better or best; he also wrongly believes that he possesses this knowledge." the good, their being weaker than pleasure is a permanent state, and that, from Plato's point of view, is the real obstacle to their happiness. In other words, where the many perceive a merely local failure of reason, Plato identifies a much more serious, global
failure.
An important passage from the Phaedo confirms this interpretation. Socrates claims that the so-called 'moderation' of ordinary people is something 'strange'
(ἄτοπος, 68d3), and he explains:
Is it licentiousness of some sort that makes them moderate? We say this is impossible, yet their experience of this simple-minded moderation turns out to be similar: they fear to be deprived of other pleasures which they desire, so they keep away from some pleasures because they are mastered by others [ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι]. Now to be ruled by pleasure [τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι] is what they call licentiousness, but what happens to them is that they master certain pleasures because they are mastered by others. This is like what we mentioned just now, that in some way it is a kind of licentiousness that has made them moderate (68e3-69a4).
Unlike the many of the Protagoras, the many in this passage successfully resist temptation. That is to say, where the many of the Protagoras manifest local failures of reason, the many of the Phaedo manifest local 'successes' of reason. 34 However, like the many of the Protagoras, the many of the Phaedo are hedonists. The reason they resist immediate temptation is for the sake of getting more pleasure in the long-term, and they therefore suffer the same global failure of reason as the many of the Protagoras. That is why their 'moderation' is no real moderation at all: "Such virtue is only an illusory appearance of virtue; it is in fact fit for slaves, without soundness or truth" (69b7-8).
With respect to their judgments about value and their ultimate goals in life-the most important determinants of living well, for Plato-they are no better off than the 'licentious' many of the Protagoras.
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34 Ferrari (1990: 121-5, 134-6 ) also discusses this passage from the Phaedo as it relates to the discussion in the Protagoras. 35 Indeed, some passages suggest that they might be worse off-e.g. Euth. 281c-e, which argues that 'courage' and 'moderation', along with other putative goods like wealth, honor, and power, are actually evils when they are controlled by ignorance. (Cf. Rep. 491b-c and Laws 696d-e.) Ferrari (1990: 136, n. 32) suggests that akratics are in at least one sense closer to philosophical awakening than those who exhibit 'popular' moderation: at least akratics are aware that there is something wrong with them (even if they are mistaken about what that something is).
What this shows is that preventing and correcting global failures is an ethical priority over correcting local ones. This is true both because of the depth, duration, and severity of the psychic impact associated with global failures, but also because, as the Phaedo makes clear, local 'successes' of reason are not sufficient for possessing virtue.
The ability to maintain and carry out one's judgments about what is valuable is of no benefit if one has mistaken values. 36 Whether akrasia is possible or not in the Republic, then, it is simply not the primary concern of an ethical reformer.
Further considerations suggest that the ethical priority of global failures is also connected to a psychological priority. In particular, I submit, global successes of reason psychologically entail and guarantee local ones: souls that are properly ruled by reason
will not be subject to instances of local failure. Conversely, the only agents who locally fail to carry out their rational judgments under the influence of non-rational motivation are those whose souls are not properly ruled to begin with. Those who are in some way or other ruled by appetite, I would like to suggest, are especially prone to local failures of reason, on Plato's view. This, then, is the second reason why Plato was not concerned with acknowledging and explaining akrasia: if it occurs at all, it is a mere side effect of improper psychic rule.
The Ignorance/Hydraulic Model of desire provides support for this interpretation.
According to that model, a large part of what it means for reason to rule in the soul is for reason to be appropriately strong in relation to the other soul-parts. In those ruled by reason, therefore, appetite and its desires will be correspondingly weak. We have also seen that, when appetite is strong and reason weak, appetite's relative strength consists in its ability to corrupt reason's judgments, and reason's relative weakness consists in its susceptibility to that corruption. What this strongly suggests is that, in an individual whose soul is properly ruled, precisely the converse will be the case: appetite's relative weakness will consist in its inability to influence reason's judgments, and reason's relative strength will consist in its invulnerability to appetite's influence. In other words, in those ruled by reason, appetite will not be sufficiently strong, nor its desires 36 Cf. Ferrari 1990: 134: "[The many] are indeed right to think that we are divided between our understanding of what is best, on the one side, and impulses which can conflict with it, on the other. The problem is that, on their conception of what this understanding would be, it (so to speak) just isn't worth being distinguished, ultimately, from the impulses with which it conflicts." psychologically salient enough, to make reason 'change its mind' (so to speak), even in local instances. Appetite's psychic influence will simply be too weak to undermine or corrupt the individual's rational judgment. Those ruled by reason, therefore, will not be subject to local failures of reason.
Conversely, those who are subject to local failures of reason will be those whose souls are not properly ruled to begin with. In particular, those whose souls are ruled by appetite and its associated desires seem, on Plato's view, to be especially susceptible to, or at least candidates for, local failures. The reason is this: as we have seen, in those ruled by appetite-such as the oligarchic individual-appetite's psychic influence has the effect that the individual rationally judges appetitive objects of desire to be valuable and worthy of pursuit. As a result, the individual's reasoning part is concerned with calculating how to maximize pleasure or wealth in the long term. There will inevitably be instances, however, in which indulgence in immediate pleasures conflict with those rational goals. In those ruled by reason, conflicts between the individual's rational goals and immediate appetitive interests will perhaps arise as well. However, because the appetitive part of the soul is weak in those ruled by reason, it will not have the psychic prominence necessary either to generate substantial psychic conflict or, a fortiori, to actually determine the individual's behavior. Those ruled by appetite, however, ex hypothesi have an appetitive part that exerts a powerful psychic influence. As a result, it is strong enough not only to bring about a global failure of reason, but also to bring about the kind of salient psychic conflict that can lead to local failures when immediate temptations present themselves. Therefore, those ruled by appetite-like the Many of the Protagoras-will be those who have a special susceptibility to psychic conflict between appetite and reason and, ultimately, to local failures.
There is some direct support for this reading, moreover. In Book 8, Socrates
explains that, because of the oligarchic man's lack of education, he will possess 'dronish'
and evil appetites that he will have to forcibly hold in check "by means of some decent part of himself" (554b-d). Socrates then comments, "So someone like that wouldn't be entirely free from civil war within himself, and he wouldn't be one, but rather in some sense two, though generally his better desires are in control of his worse" (554d9-e1).
Significantly, Socrates does not call either the aristocratic or the timocratic individual "in some sense two", despite the fact that the latter's soul is one of the 'vicious' psychic regimes. It is not until the oligarchic individual-the one ruled by appetite-that we get this characterization. I take the explanation of this fact to lie precisely in the above analysis. In the aristocratic individual, and even in the timocratic one, the appetitive part of the soul is not strong enough to constitute a significant and sustained psychic obstacle to the individual's rational desires and goals. That is not to rule out the possibility that the timocratic individual might be subject to local failures of reason. Certainly he might be subject to such failures as are associated with spirited anger, and perhaps he might even be subject to occasional failures due to the influence of appetite. The point, however, is that whatever recalcitrant impulses might arise in the aristocratic and timocratic individuals, it is not until the oligarchic individual that those impulses are prominent, powerful, and persistent enough to require constant, forcible repression. It is only those ruled by appetite who become "in some sense two". We should not conclude, however, that local failures of reason are of no ethical concern at all to Plato. Given that indulgence in appetitive pleasure strengthens the appetitive part of the soul, on Plato's view, 38 instances of local failure will exacerbate a vicious psychic condition and make it more difficult to establish a virtuous one.
Presumably, preventing local failures will be of concern especially with respect to the of Leontius, and in Socrates' subsequent remark that 'in other cases' we observe appetite 'forcing' someone contrary to his reasoning. What our examination has shown, however, is that although Plato comfortably uses much of the language of akrasia throughout the Republic, he recasts that language for his own purposes. Non-rational soul-parts and impulses-particularly appetitive ones-'force' us to change our minds (βιασθέντας, 413b9); they 'rule' and 'master' reason;; they 'enslave' it (καταδουλωσάμενος, 553d2); they 'forcefully drag it' (ἑλκομένη βίᾳ, 577e3);; and they 'compel' it (ἀναγκάζειν, 587a4 40 Carone (2001: 136-9) advocates (more strongly than I do) a similar reading of the Leontius case and of Socrates' subsequent remarks. She writes (138), "Reason is 'overpowered' not in the sense that the agent performs the action while at the same time strongly believing that he should not, but in the sense that, at that moment, his reason has been weakened and come to adopt the beliefs of the prevailing part." Brickhouse and Smith (2010: 206-10 ) offer a reply to Carone. (209) . There are three points to make in response to their argument. First, while they are certainly correct that the story does not make it seem as if Leontius had acted in accordance with his rational judgment, it is not obvious that this omission tells in their favor. For it could just as easily be said that the story does not make it seem as if Leontius had acted contrary to a rational judgment. Given that Socrates avoids discussing Leontius' reasoning entirely, it is not clear why the case 'would have to be explained differently' if Plato had understood the case as Carone suggests. Moreover, given the emphasis throughout the text on the ways in which reasoning is corrupted by appetites, it is not clear why, in the absence of any clear indication about the status of Leontius' reasoning, the burden of proof should be on Carone, rather than on those who oppose her. Second, it is not necessarily true that reason must either judge that it is all-things-considered best to gaze at corpses or judge that it is all-things-considered best to abstain from doing so. It is also possible that it simply does not judge at all, at least temporarily. In other words, it is possible that the full account of Leontius' case (and at least some other cases in which appetites 'force' us to act) is something like this:
Leontius initially judges that he should not gaze at corpses, and his reasoning and spirit are initially aligned in resisting his desire to do so. Under the influence of his appetites, however, his judgment becomes clouded and blocked from his mind, such that, at least at the moment of his action, Leontius does not hold any rational judgment at all about the particular act of corpsegazing in question. Given that Socrates has just provided an account of how correct judgments are 'lost' or 'abandoned' (and perhaps not necessarily 'replaced'), this interpretation is hardly ungrounded. Finally, note that whatever Socrates is claiming at 440a-b is something he casually assumes (rather than argues for) on the basis of mundane observation (it is something that we 'notice' [αἰσθανόμεθα, 440a8] ). If the point he is making is one that can be readily extracted from everyday experience, however, then that suggests it is not intended as an important philosophical claim, and certainly not as a rejection of a previously argued-for position. Ultimately, I have no strong commitment to the readings of Leontius that Carone or I have offered, but I do think that those readings should be recognized as, at the very least, permitted by the text.
I do not claim that this interpretation of the Leontius case and Socrates' remarks at 440a-b is necessitated by the text, however. Indeed, although Plato never explicitly acknowledges akrasia in the Republic, it is also clear that he never explicitly rules out its possibility. However, and this is the crucial second conclusion that we can draw from
Plato's treatment of psychic relationships in the text: even if Plato had come to accept the possibility of akrasia, he nonetheless seems to have thought that, as a matter of empirical fact, appetite tends to bring about failures of reason not by forcing individuals to act against their concurrently held better judgments, but rather by corrupting those judgments. There is nothing inconsistent about believing both that akrasia is in principle possible and that it rarely (or even never) actually occurs. 41 Plato's consistent attention to preventing the vacillation and corruption of reason's judgment in the text, rather than akratic action, shows at least that he took the former to be the much more prevalent and ethically significant phenomenon. This, then, is a further reason why Plato was not interested in countenancing akrasia: he took it to be either an impossibility or, at most, a negligible anomaly. Either way, it was not worth addressing.
Conclusion
There are two final issues that I would like briefly to address. The first concerns the spirited part of the soul, about which I have said very little in this paper. One reason for that is simply that the most prominent cases of putative akrasia are those involving appetite and appetitive desires. Socrates mentions non-rational impulses other than pleasure when he takes on the Many's position in the Protagoras-including anger-but it is on pleasure that he focuses his account. If akrasia were possible at all, on Plato's view, then we would expect it to be possible first and foremost in cases involving conflict between reason and appetite. Indeed, as we have seen, Plato thinks that rational desires and appetitive ones are in a unique kind of tension with each other, "as if they were on 41 Cf. Price 1995: 97: "We might expect [Plato's] writings to be rich in case-studies of hard akrasia. In fact, they contain few. We shall need to reflect why he expects reason to be more often suborned than subdued." opposite scales of a balance". 42 Despite my neglect of spirit, however, it should be noted that I do take the spirited part of the soul to have an important role to play in the Platonic account of psychic mastery and rule. Plato characterizes spirit in the Republic as reason's psychic 'ally'. Along with reason, it is supposed to 'watch over' the appetitive part of the soul in order to make sure "that it doesn't become so big and strong… that it attempts to enslave and rule over the other classes it isn't fitted to rule" (442a5-b2). I take it that one of spirit's primary roles as reason's ally, then, is to 'do its part' (however that is to be worked out) to prevent both local and global failures of reason. Its job, in other words, is to make sure that appetite remains weak, and appetite's psychic influence minimal, so that it does not influence or corrupt the judgments of reason.
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The second issue is that of developmentalism. The conclusions of my paper suggest that there is much more continuity between the moral psychology of the Protagoras and that of the Republic than has typically been thought. To begin with, it is not clear that Plato's attitude toward akrasia underwent the sharp reversal that many versions of the prevalent interpretation allege. In the Protagoras Socrates concludes that all putative cases of akrasia are really just cases of fluctuating judgment and ignorance.
Under the influence of our appetites and the Power of Appearances, he explains, immediate pleasures appear bigger and more intense than long-term ones, and that appearance causes us to make mistaken judgments about the value of those competing pleasures. In the Republic, we have seen, Plato does not provide this kind of unequivocal rejection of akrasia. However, he never explicitly acknowledges the possibility akrasia either, and his presentation of appetite's control of reason consistently emphasizes ways 42 Furthermore, although local failures of reason due to the influence of the spirited part of the soul-most obviously, cases involving impetuous anger-are no doubt possible on Plato's account, it is generally much easier to reconcile such cases with a denial of the possibility of akrasia. For cases of impetuous anger characteristically involve acting in haste, which suggests that the individual might act before making a rational judgment about what she ought to do. If that is the case, then in acting that way she does not act contrary to a concurrently held rational judgment. Cf. the analyses of impetuous or spirited anger offered at Laws 866d-867c and in Aristotle (EN 1149a24-1150a8) . I discuss the former in Wilburn (2012) 43 I provide an analysis of the spirited part's psychological role in the Republic, and in particular its function in the virtue of courage, in Wilburn (forthcoming) .
in which reasoning is destabilized or corrupted, rather than forcibly overcome. Nor, however, should we think that Republic's lack of interest in explaining akrasia represents a shift in Plato's priorities. In the Protagoras, the emphasis of
Socrates' argument against the many is overwhelmingly on affirming the supremacy of knowledge. It is not until 358b, in fact, after Socrates has completed his argument against the many, that he concludes that no one acts contrary to what he knows or believes to be best (and thereby denies the possibility of akrasia entirely). 45 Up until that point, his
focus is exclusively on demonstrating the impossibility of acting contrary to one's knowledge, without commenting directly on whether it is possible to act contrary to mere belief. When he finally does draw that conclusion, it has the status of an afterthought.
Indeed, the purpose of Socrates' discussion is to point out that, contrary to what the many believe, they do not know what is good for them when they do what is bad for them. For
Plato, this has a double meaning: they are ignorant because they do not know (as they think they do), at the time that they choose it, that the pleasure they are choosing is less than the pleasure they are forfeiting; and furthermore, they are ignorant because they do not know that pleasure is not really the criterion of goodness. Whereas the former point is what the many take away from the discussion, the latter point is the one that matters to
Plato. The many have corrupt values under the influence of their appetites-they are 'ruled by pleasure' whether they resist temptation or not-and that is their real moral affliction. 46 This is precisely the moral psychological insight that is explored by the Republic, through its methodical examination of the soul's structure and the relationships of rule among its parts. 
